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Electoral	Engineering	in	Divided	Societies : 	
The	Choice	of	Electoral	System	and	Contextual	Conditions
Takanori	SUMINO＊
Abstract
	 Traditionally,	a	profound	disagreement	has	existed	between	centripetal	and	consociational	theorists	over	
which	electoral	system	is	best	suited	to	managing	ethnic	conflicts	in	deeply	divided	societies.	The	first	part	
of	this	paper	provides	a	brief	overview	of	the	two	groups’	approaches,	with	a	focus	on	the	Alternative	Vote	
(AV),	Single	Transferable	Vote	(STV)	and	party-list	proportional	representation	(list-PR).	The	second	part	
illustrates	how	the	choice	of	voting	system	depends	on	the	social	and	demographic	conditions	of	a	given	
society	and	why	the	application	of	preferential	voting	systems	advocated	by	centripetalists	should	be	
limited	under	certain	circumstances.
Keywords : preferential	voting	system;	divided	societies;	consociationalism;	centripetalism;	socio-
demographic	conditions
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1.	 Introduction
	 Although	it	is	widely	recognized	among	scholars	that	the	choice	of	electoral	system	has	a	significant	impact	
on	conflict	management	in	poly-ethnic	societies	(Lijphart	2004: 96-7),	no	consensus	exists	among	experts,	
particularly	between	centripetalists	 and	consociationalists,	 about	which	electoral	 system	 is	 the	most	
appropriate	for	ethnically	segmented	societies.	As	some	theorists	point	out,	the	choice	of	electoral	system	is	
“ultimately	contextual	and	will	depend	on	the	specific	cleavages	and	divisions	within	any	given	society”	(Sisk	
&	Reynolds	1998: 7).	Therefore,	rather	than	following	a	crude	“one-size-fits-all”	approach	for	a	wide	variety	
of	divided	societies,	we	need	to	consider	contextual	factors	such	as	social	and	demographic	conditions	in	each	
society	(Reilly	2001: 141).	 If	 this	 is	 the	best	approach,	however,	we	must	 then	question	how	contextual	
conditions	provide	different	implications	for	the	choice	of	electoral	system.	To	address	this	question,	I	first	
examine	the	characteristics	of	three	electoral	systems—the	Alternative	Vote	(AV),	Single	Transferable	Vote	
(STV),	and	party-list	proportional	 representation	(list-PR)	systems—and	then	show	how	two	contextual	
conditions,	(1)	the	people’s	support	for	moderate	political	parties	and	(2)	demographic	distribution,	impact	the	
selection	of	one	of	 the	three	electoral	methods.	In	 this	paper,	I	argue	that,	because	of	 the	key	features	of	
preferential	voting	systems,	namely	 the	majoritarian	nature	and	 the	premise	of	vote	 transferability,	 the	
adoption	of	ranked-ballot	systems	must	be	limited	in	certain	social	and	demographic	contexts.	I	use	empirical	
evidence	from	Estonia,	Northern	Ireland,	and	Fiji	as	examples	in	my	theoretical	arguments.
2.	 Centripetalism	Versus	Consociationalism
2-1		The	Alternative	Vote
	 Defenders	of	centripetalism,	such	as	Donald	L.	Horowitz,	advocate	the	application	of	the	preferential	voting	
systems,	particularly	AV,	for	conflict	management	 in	deeply	divided	societies.	 In	 the	AV	system,	usually	
operated	in	single-member	districts	(SMD),	electors	are	allowed	to	rank	candidates	in	the	order	of	their	choice	
(e.g.,	1,	2,	3).	A	candidate	who	receives	an	absolute	majority	of	votes	(50	percent	plus	1)	is	elected	outright	
(Reilly	2001: 16).	If	all	candidates	fail	to	receive	an	absolute	majority,	the	candidate	with	the	lowest	amount	
of	votes	is	removed,	and	the	ballots	of	the	excluded	candidate	are	distributed	among	the	remaining	candidates	
according	to	the	electors’	secondary	preferences (Reilly	2001: 16).	This	process	continues	until	one	candidate	
gains	more	than	50	percent	of	votes	(Reilly	2001: 16).	Therefore,	AV	is	often	classified	as	a	majoritarian	
system.	In	this	respect,	the	AV	system	is	similar	to	the	First-Past-the-Post	(FPTP)	voting	system	with	which	it	
shares	key	features	such	as	the	“winner-take-all”	principle	and	single-member	district	rules.	However,	the	AV	
system	is	distinguishable	 from	the	FPTP	system	in	 that	 it	allows	voters	 to	express	different	degrees	of	
preference	for	each	candidate	rather	than	only	their	first	choice.
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2-2		The	Single	Transferable	Vote
	 In	contrast	to	the	AV	system,	the	STV	system	is	usually	categorized	as	a	variant	of	PR	systems,	which	are	
usually	used	for	elections	 in	multi-member	districts	 (MMD).	Under	 the	STV	system,	 the	quota	for	each	
constituency,	that	is,	the	minimum	number	of	votes	required	to	be	elected,	is	initially	calculated	by	using	the	
Droop	quota	formula.1）	Subsequently,	in	the	same	manner	as	in	the	AV	system,	electors	rank	the	candidates	
according	to	the	order	of	their	choice,	and	the	candidate	who	satisfies	the	quota	is	immediately	elected	(Reilly	
2001: 17–8).	The	surplus	votes	for	 the	first	winner	are	then	redistributed	among	the	remaining	candidates	
according	to	the	next	choice	marked	on	the	ballot	papers	(Reilly	2001: 17–8).	At	this	point,	if	no	candidate	
fulfills	the	quota,	the	one	with	the	lowest	number	of	votes	is	removed,	and	his/her	votes	are	reallocated	to	the	
other	candidates	(ibid.).	This	process	is	repeated	until	all	seats	for	the	electoral	district	are	filled	(ibid.).
2-3		Centripetal	Effects
	 Proponents	of	the	centripetal	approaches	insist	that	such	preferential	voting	systems	can	contribute	greatly	to	
conflict	management	in	ethnically	segmented	societies.	This	is	because	they	change	the	nature	of	interactions	
among	political	actors	from	a	hostile	zero-sum	to	a	cooperative	positive-sum	game	(Reilly	2001: 5,	167).
	 According	 to	centripetalists,	 for	example,	preferential	voting	systems	give	candidates	and	parties	an	
incentive	to	attract	broad	support	across	ethnic	lines	(Horowitz	1993: 33).	Under	these	systems,	electors	are	
expected	 to	cast	 their	second	and	third	preference	votes	for	moderate	parties,	 irrespective	of	 their	ethnic	
origin.	This	possibility	encourages	 the	politicians	and	parties	 to	moderate	 their	political	positions	and	
cooperate	with	other	ethnic	parties	in	order	to	receive	second	and	third	preference	votes	from	the	electors	
outside	their	own	ethnic	support	base	(Horowitz	2000: 640).
	 Second,	 the	preferential	voting	systems	also	motivate	 the	ethnic	parties	 to	negotiate	and	bargain	over	
competing	political	 interests,	offering	an	arena	for	 inter-ethnic	dialogues	(Reilly	2001: 167;	2006: 816).	
Frequent	 face-to-face	negotiations	and	compromise	among	 the	politicians	 from	different	ethnic	groups	
mitigate	 the	polarization	of	political	positions	and	mobilization	of	ethnic	radicals	 (Dawisha	&	Diamond	
2006: 102).	Such	an	argument	is	in	line	with	James	Fearon	and	David	Laitin’s	theory	that	conflict-oriented	
interethnic	relations	are	often	caused	by	a	lack	of	information	about	the	“ethnic	others”	(1996: 717–9).	If	a	
lack	of	 interethnic	dialogues	 fosters	 tension	between	 rival	ethnic	groups,	 then	 frequent	and	 recurring	
interactions	across	ethnic	divides	would	likely	mitigate	hostility	and	distrust	among	competing	ethnic	groups.	
This,	in	turn,	would	alleviate	the	centrifugal	tendencies	of	ethnically	cleaved	societies.	Conversely,	as	Cass	R.	
Sunstein	(2000: 74)	argues,	frequent	group	deliberation	among	homogeneous,	like-minded	people	often	shifts	
initial	political	positions	toward	a	more	extreme	point,	leading	to	social	destabilization.
	   1）	The	Droop	Quota	=	{y	/	(x	+	1)}	+	1,	where	x	is	the	number	of	seats	to	be	elected	in	the	constituency	and	y	is	the	total	number	of	votes	cast.	See	
Tideman,	N.	(1995)	“The	Single	Transferable	Vote,”	The Journal of Economic Perspectives,	9	(1),	p.	30.
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	 Third,	ranked-ballot	systems	provide	politicians	with	incentives	to	form	multi-ethnic	centrist	coalitions	prior	
to	 the	elections	 (Horowitz	2004: 511).	 Incentives	 for	moderation	and	bargaining	promote	 interethnic	
cooperation,	such	as	cross-ethnic	vote-pooling	and	preference	swapping,	through	pre-election	pacts	among	
parties	across	ethnic	lines	(Reilly	2001: 56,	75,	176).	Such	interethnic	affiliations	might	“make	politicians	
reciprocally	dependent	on	the	votes	of	members	of	groups	other	 than	their	own”	(Reilly	2002: 157),	and	
ethnic	coalitions	may	adopt	“ethnicity-blind”	policies	(Sisk	1996: xi)	rather	than	ethnicity-oriented	ones	to	
maintain	and	promote	an	affiliation	between	competing	ethnic	parties.
2-4		Consociationalism	and	List-PR	System
	 These	centripetalist	approaches	can	be	contrasted	with	the	consociationalist	approaches	advocated	by	Arend	
Lijphart	and	his	followers.	Consociationalism	is	characterized	by	four	basic	elements:	 (1)	power-sharing	
among	political	elites	(i.e.,	a	“grand	coalition”),	(2)	a	mutual	veto	over	crucial	decisions	that	directly	affect	the	
members	of	each	ethnic	group,	 (3)	 list-PR	that	helps	reflect	 the	complexity	of	ethnic	preferences	 to	 the	
distribution	of	 legislative	seats,	and	(4)	a	significant	degree	of	segmental	autonomy	for	each	ethnic	group	
(Lijphart	1977: 25–41).	As	 these	characteristics	 indicate,	 the	essence	of	consociationalism	 is	 the	clear	
differentiation	of	competing	ethnic	communities	rather	than	bridging	the	cleavages	among	them.
	 For	the	proponents	of	consociationalism,	the	ideal	electoral	system	is	list-PR,	in	which	parties	provide	lists	
of	candidates	to	be	elected	and	electors	cast	votes	for	the	party	lists	instead	of	individual	candidates	(Lijphart	
2008: 187).	The	major	goal	of	 list-PR	 is	 to	 reflect	 the	diverse	preferences	of	all	ethnic	groups	 into	 the	
distribution	of	parliamentary	seats	and	to	ensure	fair	representation	of	all	ethnic	parties	without	excluding	
ethnic	minorities	(Lijphart	2008: 181).	In	a	deeply	divided	society,	 the	elimination	of	political	minorities	
results	in	the	consolidation	of	an	ethnic	identity	(Birnir	2007: 48)	and	hostility	toward	majority	winners.	In	
this	respect,	in	ethnically	segmented	societies,	it	is	somewhat	optimistic	to	assume,	as	Adam	Przeworski	states	
(1991: 19),	that	electoral	losers	will	accept	defeat	and	peacefully	anticipate	the	opportunity	to	promote	their	
interests	 in	 future	 elections.	Thus,	 for	 consociationalists,	 list-PR	 is	 the	optimal	 electoral	 system	 for	
maximizing	the	proportionality	and	inclusiveness	of	ethnic	minorities	and,	ultimately,	for	producing	tension-
free	multi-party	parliaments	(Reilly	&	Reynolds	1999: 22).
	 In	short,	as	centripetalists	argue,	the	preferential	voting	systems	have	the	potential	to	encourage	reciprocal	
cooperation	among	competing	ethnic	parties	 through	moderation,	 interethnic	 interaction,	and	coalition	
formation.	However,	the	majoritarian	nature	of	the	preferential	voting	systems,	particularly	the	AV	system,	
raises	questions	about	 the	appropriateness	of	 the	electoral	systems	in	ethnically	plural	societies	 in	which	
political	exclusion	of	ethnic	minorities	often	leads	to	the	mobilization	of	secessionist	forces.
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3.	 Contextual	Conditions:	People’s	Support	for	Moderate	Ethnic	Parties	and	Demographic	
Distribution
	 Whether	the	preferential	voting	systems	are	appropriate	for	ethnically	divided	societies	is	highly	dependent	
on	the	contextual	factors	within	a	given	society.	In	this	paper,	I	focus	on	two	contextual	determinants:	(1)	The	
people’s	support	for	moderate	ethnic	parties	and	(2)	demographic	distribution.
3-1		Model	Case	1:	Group	A	(70%),	Group	B	(30%)
	 First,	consider	an	ethnically	divided	society	in	which	the	proportion	of	the	largest	ethnic	group	population	is	
more	than	50	percent.	For	example,	70	percent	of	the	population	is	dominated	by	Group	A	and	30	percent	is	
comprised	of	Group	B,	and	support	for	moderate	parties	is	weak	in	both	camps	owing	to	factor	such	as	strong	
hostility	against	 the	other	ethnic	group.2）	 In	 this	society,	many	people	 in	both	groups	would	most	 likely	
support	 their	own	extremist	or	secessionist	parties	(E
A
	for	Group	A	and	E
B
	for	Group	B)	rather	 than	 the	
moderate	parties	(M
A
	for	Group	A	and	M
B
	for	Group	B).	Moreover,	 the	strong	hostility	against	 the	ethnic	
others	might	lower	the	frequency	of	vote	transfers	across	ethnic	divides	(e.g.,	Figure	1.1.).	In	such	a	society,	
politicians	from	Group	A	have	little	incentive	to	appeal	to	the	voters	of	other	ethnic	groups	because	they	are	
able	to	secure	support	from	their	own	ethnic	base	(Frankel	&	Grofman	2006: 647–8).	For	this	reason,	 the	
preference	order	of	Group	A	voters	would	be	E
A
>M
A
>M
B
>E
B
,	and	 that	of	Group	B	voters	would	be	
E
B
>M
B
>M
A
>E
A
.	In	this	situation,	if	a	majoritarian	voting	system,	such	as	AV,	was	adopted,	the	candidates	of	
ethnic	parties	from	Group	B	would	be	easily	eliminated	from	the	race,	leading	to	the	dominance	of	Group	A	in	
each	single-member	constituency.	Thus,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	AV	system	is	 inappropriate	for	 this	society.	In	
addition,	since	 the	proportionality	of	 the	STV	system	is	highly	dependent	on	 the	 transferability	of	votes	
(Lijphart	2008: 195),	this	is	also	not	a	desirable	choice	for	this	society	because	cross-ethnic	vote	transfers	are	
unlikely.	This	model	case	is	exemplified	by	the	1990	election	in	Estonia,	in	which	an	STV	electoral	system	
was	adopted.	 In	 this	election,	most	Estonian	electors	cast	 their	votes	 to	 their	own	ethnic	parties,	 and	
centripetal	effects,	 such	as	cross-ethnic	voting	and	vote-pooling	between	dominant	Estonian-speaking	
communities	and	Russian-speaking	minorities,	were	limited	(Reilly	2001: 134).	Considering	this,	the	best	and	
only	choice	for	this	case	would	be	list-PR.
	   2）	This	situation	would	often	occur	after	a	violent	ethnic	conflict	or	ethnic	cleansing.
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	 On	the	other	hand,	if	we	consider	a	society	in	which	the	majority	of	people	prefer	moderate	ethnic	parties,	
we	might	be	able	to	anticipate	cross-ethnic	vote	transfers	from	the	removed	candidates	of	radical	parties	to	
those	of	moderate	parties	 (e.g.,	Figure	1.2);3）	 therefore,	 in	 this	circumstance,	AV	could	be	an	option.	
Nevertheless,	under	 the	majoritarian	electoral	systems,	 the	demographic	domination	of	Group	A	would	
minimize	the	political	representation	of	Group	B	in	each	single-member	district,	making	it	undesirable	to	
adopt	the	AV	system.	By	contrast,	 the	STV	system	would	be	a	possibility	for	this	society.	For	instance,	the	
STV	elections	in	Northern	Ireland	in	1998	successfully	yielded	centripetal	outcomes	through	the	frequent	vote	
transfers	of	moderate	electors,	a	phenomenon	witnessed	hardly	 in	 the	area’s	previous	elections	 (Reilly	
2001: 136–7).	Thus,	for	this	society,	list-PR	or	STV	are	recommended.
3-2		Model	Case	2:	Group	A	(53%),	Group	B	(47%)
	 Next,	we	consider	a	society	in	which	the	population	is	divided	into	two	quasi-equal-number	ethnic	groups,	
for	example,	53	percent	for	Group	A	and	47	percent	for	Group	B.	If	support	for	moderate	ethnic	parties	is	
limited	 in	both	ethnic	sides,	 for	 reasons	such	as	a	strong	 identification	with	 their	own	ethnic	groups	or	
hostility	against	ethnic	others,	and	vote	transfers	across	ethnic	lines	are	hardly	expectable	(e.g.,	Figure	2.1.),	
the	choice	order	of	Group	A	electors	would	be	E
A
>M
A
>M
B
>E
B
,	and	 that	of	Group	B	voters	would	be	
E
B
>M
B
>M
A
>E
A
.	In	this	society,	it	is	uncertain	whether	ethnic	parties	would	be	able	to	secure	the	majority	
support	with	the	votes	from	their	own	ethnic	base.	Therefore,	we	could	expect	incentive-driven	interethnic	
cooperation,	as	Horowitz	and	other	centripetalists	suggest.	However,	even	so,	in	this	case,	the	weak	support	
for	moderate	ethnic	parties	may	prevent	their	candidates	from	receiving	first	preference	votes	in	each	electoral	
district,	putting	parliament	under	 the	control	of	ethnic	radicals	 (E
A
	or	E
B
).	The	result	of	 the	2001	Fijian	
election,4）	which	used	the	AV	system,	illustrates	this	situation.	In	this	election,	political	positions	of	Fijian	
people	were	sharply	polarized,	and	the	voters’	first	preferences	tended	to	be	cast	on	radical	ethnic	parties	of	
	   3）	The	preference	order	of	Group	A	would	be	M
A
	>	M
B
	>	E
A
	>	E
B,
	and	that	of	Group	B	would	be	M
B
	>	M
A
	>	E
B
	>	E
A
.
	   4）	The	population	of	Fiji	is	comprised	of	52%	indigenous	Fijians	and	44%	people	of	Indian	origins	(Fraenkel	&	Grofman	2006: 632).
Figure 1.1.  Frequent Intra-Ethnic Vote Transfers
Notes:	Arrows	indicate	expected	vote	transfers.	Group	A	(EA	+	MA)	=	70%,	Group	B	(EB	+	MB)	=	30%.
Figure 1.2.  Frequent Inter-Ethnic Vote Transfers
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each	group	(Fraenkel	&	Grofman	2006: 636).	In	such	a	situation,	 if	 the	AV	system	is	used,	radical	ethnic	
parties	might	gain	the	most	first	preference	votes	from	their	own	ethnic	support	base,	and	the	parliament	
would	most	 likely	be	dominated	by	a	 radical	ethnic	party,	which	 in	 turn	would	destabilize	 the	society.	
Therefore,	 the	AV	system	is	removed	from	the	options	 list,	and	the	 list-PR	or	at	 least	 the	STV	system	is	
recommended.
	 In	contrast,	if	we	can	expect	vote	transfers	across	ethnic	divides	and	moderate	parties	are	the	first	choices	for	
many	people	(e.g.,	Figure	2.2.),5）	 the	AV	system	could	be	included	in	the	array	of	electoral	system	options	
along	with	the	STV	and	list-PR	systems.	For	example,	the	evidence	from	the	1999	Fijian	election	proved	the	
centripetal	effects	of	 the	AV	system.	In	 this	election,	as	Horowitzian	theorists	expected,	 two	multi-ethnic	
coalitions	were	formed,	and	preference	votes	were	transferred	across	the	ethnic	line	between	native	Fijian	and	
Indian	communities,	which	dramatically	changed	Fiji’s	political	spectrum	(Fraenkel	&	Grofman	2006: 633–
4).	Thus,	under	such	social	and	demographic	conditions,	the	AV	system	would	be	an	option.
3-3		Model	Case	3:	Group	A	(40%),	Group	B	(30%),	Group	C	(30%)
	 In	the	next	example,	we	consider	a	society	in	which	the	proportion	of	the	largest	ethnic	group	population	is	
less	than	50	percent,	for	example,	40	percent	of	the	population	is	from	Group	A,	and	the	rest	is	comprised	of	
Group	B	(30	percent)	and	Group	C	(30	percent).	If	support	for	moderate	ethnic	parties	is	very	weak,	because	
of	reasons	such	as	a	strong	identification	with	their	own	ethnicity	or	an	abhorrence	of	other	ethnic	origins,	and	
if	votes	are	unlikely	to	be	transferred	to	the	parties	of	other	ethnic	groups	(e.g.,	Figure	3.1.),	the	preference	
order	of	Group	A	would	be	E
A
>M
A
>M
B
>M
C
>E
B
>E
C
	or	E
A
>M
A
>M
C
>M
B
>E
C
>E
B
.6）	In	this	society,	both	
the	preference	order	of	Group	A	voters	and	the	electoral	strategies	of	 the	ethnic	parties	are	uncertain.	For	
	   5）	The	preference	order	of	Group	A	would	be	M
A
	>	M
B
	>	E
A
	>	E
B
	and	that	of	Group	B	would	be	M
B
	>	M
A
	>	E
B
	>	E
A
.
	   6）	Of	course,	other	preference	orders	are	also	possible,	for	example,	E
A
	>	M
A
	>	M
B
	>	E
B
	>	M
C
	>	E
C
.	The	main	point	here	is	the	fact	that	cross-ethnic	
vote	transfers	would	be	hardly	expectable	in	this	case.
Figure 2.1.  Frequent Intra-Ethnic Vote Transfers
Notes:	Arrows	indicate	expected	vote	transfers.	Group	A	(E
A
	+	M
A
)	=	53%,	Group	B	(E
B
	+	M
B
)	=	47%.
Figure 2.2.  Frequent Inter-Ethnic Vote Transfers
国際公共政策研究  第16巻第 2 号172
example,	 the	ethnic	parties	of	Group	A	might	cooperate	with	 those	of	Group	B	and	form	a	coalition	 to	
dominate	the	parliament,	minimizing	the	representation	of	Group	C.7）	Such	uncertainty	of	preference	order	
and	the	possibility	of	coalition	formation	can	also	be	expected	for	Group	B	and	C.	In	such	a	society,	if	the	AV	
system	was	adopted,	a	coalition	of	 two	ethnic	groups	(M
A
	and	E
B
,	E
B
	and	E
C
,	etc.)	would	eliminate	 the	
representation	of	the	third	party.	Therefore,	this	system	is	again	removed	from	the	menu	of	options,	and	the	
list-PR	or	at	least	the	STV	system	is	recommended.
	 In	contrast,	if	the	majority	of	people	prefer	moderate	parties	rather	than	radical	secessionist	ones,	and	vote	
transfers	across	ethnic	lines	are	highly	expectable	(e.g.,	Figure	3.2.),8）	the	incentive	for	politicians	to	cooperate	
with	other	 ethnic	parties	 and	make	an	 interethnic	 coalition	becomes	much	 stronger.	 In	 this	 case,	 as	
centripetalists	argue,	the	preferential	voting	systems	may	promote	multi-ethnic	coalition	formation.	However,	
the	high	transferability	of	votes	would	make	the	possibility	of	a	two-party	coalition	that	excluded	the	third	
ethnic	group	far	more	likely.	Thus,	the	best	option	for	this	society	would	be	the	list-PR	system.
4.	 Conclusion
	 I	argue	that	the	choice	of	voting	system	is	highly	dependent	on	social	and	demographic	factors	including	the	
support	 for	moderate	ethnic	parties	and	demographic	distribution	of	ethnic	groups.	As	 the	advocates	for	
integrative	approaches	argue,	 the	preferential	voting	systems	may	produce	centripetal	effects	 such	as	
moderation,	 inter-ethnic	communication,	and	coalition	 formation.	However,	 the	characteristics	of	 the	
preferential	voting	systems,	in	particular,	 the	majoritarian	nature	and	the	implicit	assumption	that	votes	are	
always	 transferable	across	ethnic	divides,	make	 the	alleged	centripetal	effects	highly	contextual.	The	
arguments	of	this	paper	are	summarized	in	Figure	4.
	   7）	A	coalition	of	the	ethnic	parties	of	Group	A	and	C	or	Group	B	and	C	is	also	a	possibility.
	   8）	In	this	case,	the	preference	order	of	Group	A	would	be	M
A
	>	M
B
	>	M
C
	>	E
A
	>	E
B
	>	E
C
,	for	example.
Figure 3.1.  Frequent Intra-Ethnic Vote Transfers
Notes:	Arrows	indicate	expected	vote	transfers.	Group	A	(E
A
	+	M
A
)	=	40%,	Group	B	(E
B
	+	M
B
)	=	30%,	Group	C	(E
C
	+	M
C
)	=	30%.
Figure 3.2.  Frequent Inter-Ethnic Vote Transfers
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	 Finally,	it	seems	difficult	for	politicians	and	constitution	writers	to	correctly	assess	the	degree	of	people’s	
support	for	moderate	parties	or	their	ethnic	sentiments	in	a	deeply	segmented	society.	This	difficulty	arises	
because,	as	the	examples	of	Estonia,	Northern	Ireland,	and	Fiji	show,	the	support	level	for	moderate	ethnic	
parties	or	 the	degree	of	ethnic	polarization	can	change	over	 time	 in the same society.	For	example,	 the	
recurrence	of	ethnic	strife	would	easily	foster	hatred	and	division	among	ethnic	communities.	Considering	
such	sensitivity	of	ethnic	cleavages	and	 the	dynamic	nature	of	ethnic	sentiments,	 it	seems	dangerous	 to	
assume	a priori that	the	degree	of	support	for	moderate	ethnic	parties	in	a	divided	society	would	be	always	
strong,	and	that	a	majority	of	electors	would	cast	their	votes	irrespective	of	their	ethnic	origins.	Therefore,	this	
paper	 implies	 that	 list-PR,	as	advocated	by	Lijphart	and	other	consociationalists,	 is	 the	most	stable	and	
durable	electoral	system	in	conflict-prone	societies.
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